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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
      v.
LARRY SMITH,
               Appellant
 ____________
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Delaware
D.C. No.: 03-cr-00356-1 
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
____________
Submitted on Motion Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 12, 2005
Before: SLOVITER, McKEE, and ROSENN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed:  July 20, 2005)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
ROSENN, Circuit Judge.
Larry Smith was tried to a jury in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania and convicted of one count of robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18
    The District Court sentenced Smith to 88 months’ imprisonment on count one1
(Hobbs Act robbery) and on count three (attempted carjacking), to run concurrently.  On
count two (brandishing a firearm), the District Court sentenced Smith to 84 months’
imprisonment, to run consecutively with his sentence on counts one and three.  On count
four (brandishing a firearm), the District Court sentenced Smith to 300 months’
imprisonment, to run consecutively with his sentence on counts one, two, and three. 
2
U.S.C. § 1951, one count of attempted carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, and
two counts of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c).  Smith moved for a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, alleging
prosecutorial and juror misconduct.  After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court
denied Smith’s Rule 33 motion.  The District Court imposed on Smith a $400 assessment
and $1,000 fine, and sentenced him to a total of 472 months’ imprisonment,  to be1
followed by 5 years’ supervised release. 
On appeal, Smith argues that the District Court abused its discretion in denying
his Rule 33 motion for a new trial.  Smith also raises sentencing claims under United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. ----, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005).  For the reasons
stated below, we affirm Smith’s conviction, but vacate his sentence and remand for
resentencing in accordance with Booker.  Because we write primarily for the parties, their
counsel, and the District Court, we briefly set forth only the salient facts leading to
Smith’s conviction and sentence.    
I.
 Smith’s allegations of juror and prosecutorial misconduct stem from an
extrajudicial interaction between one of the jurors in his case and an Assistant United
    AUSA Zauzmer briefly discussed a legal issue pertaining to Smith’s case with the2
prosecuting attorney, prior to the trial.  AUSA Zauzmer never appeared in Smith’s case.
3
States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Robert Zauzmer (“AUSA
Zauzmer”), who was not involved in the prosecution of his case.   This juror and AUSA2
Zauzmer were acquaintances of ten years who had both belonged to, and regularly
attended services at, the same synagogue. 
The first day of jury deliberations in Smith’s case occurred on a Friday.  That
evening, the juror and AUSA Zauzmer were attending services at their synagogue.  The
juror approached AUSA Zauzmer and told him that he was sitting on a federal jury in a
criminal case before Judge Robreno. The juror identified the prosecutor, AUSA
Fitzgerald, and mentioned that the jury was deliberating.  Immediately, AUSA Zauzmer
demanded that the juror “get away” from him, and ended the conversation.  Later that
evening, the juror approached AUSA Zauzmer’s wife, conveyed the same information to
her about his jury service, and jokingly remarked that Zauzmer had been “mean to [him],”
by refusing to speak with him.  AUSA Zauzmer’s wife advised the juror that he “better
not talk” with her husband, and he did not. 
AUSA Zauzmer did not advise the District Court, Smith’s defense counsel, or the
prosecutor about this interaction. On the following Monday, Smith’s jury resumed
deliberations and reached a verdict, finding Smith guilty on all counts, but acquitting his
co-defendant brother on all counts.  After the trial, as AUSA Fitzgerald was leaving the
courthouse, the juror approached her and began to make “small talk” about the trial.  
4Eventually, counsel for Smith’s co-defendant joined in the conversation, after which point
the juror mentioned that he had met AUSA Zauzmer on the preceding Friday evening and
had told Zauzmer that he was serving on a jury in a federal criminal trial.  
Smith moved for a new trial under Rule 33, alleging prosecutorial and juror
misconduct.  Smith argued that AUSA Zauzmer engaged in misconduct by failing to
bring his interaction with the juror to the District Court’s attention, and that the juror
flagrantly disregarded the Court’s repeated instructions that jurors not discuss the case. 
The District Court held an evidentiary hearing, during which the juror, AUSA Zauzmer,
and AUSA Fitzgerald testified.  The juror testified that he had no intention of discussing
the case with AUSA Zauzmer, and that he was simply engaging in “social chitchat” by
mentioning that he was currently serving on a jury.  The juror also testified that his
feelings were “slightly hurt” when AUSA Zauzmer refused to speak with him, but that he
was not influenced by this interaction.
In a careful opinion, the District Court concluded that the brief interaction
between the juror and AUSA Zauzmer involved no misconduct.  Further, assuming
arguendo that the juror had violated the Court’s order not to discuss the case with anyone,
the Court found that Smith had suffered no prejudice.  The Court found credible the
juror’s testimony that he remained impartial throughout the deliberations.  The Court also
determined that “a hypothetical average juror” would not have been influenced by this
limited extrajudicial contact with AUSA Zauzmer. 
5We review the District Court’s denial of Smith’s Rule 33 motion for an abuse of
discretion.  See United States v. Jasin, 280 F.3d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 2002).  The discretion
that federal trial courts exercise in addressing allegations of juror and prosecutorial
misconduct “extends to the determination of whether prejudice has been demonstrated.”
United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 690 (3d Cir. 1993).   
Although the juror’s attempt to engage AUSA Zauzmer in conversation was
imprudent, AUSA Zauzmer responded appropriately by terminating it immediately. 
There is no basis for rejecting the District Court’s finding that the juror remained
impartial, and that Smith suffered no prejudice as a result of this fleeting interaction
between the juror and AUSA Zauzmer.  Smith’s theory that the juror, after having been
rebuffed by AUSA Zauzmer, attempted to curry favor with the prosecution by helping the
jury return a guilty verdict, is undermined by the jury’s acquittal of Smith’s co-defendant. 
For this and other reasons discussed by the District Court in its opinion, it is apparent that
Smith suffered no prejudice.  Thus, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Smith’s Rule 33 motion for a new trial.
II.
Smith challenges his sentence under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. ----, 125 S.
Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed.2d 621 (2005).  He argues that the District Court impermissibly
enhanced his sentence based on findings relating to his prior convictions and the value of
the vehicle that he attempted to carjack.  We see no error with the District Court’s
6sentencing enhancement based on Smith’s prior convictions.  See United States v. Ordaz,
398 F.3d 236, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2005).  Not only has the Supreme Court “specifically
exempted prior convictions from its holding” in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000), see Ordaz, 398 F.3d at 240, but judicial notice of a final prior conviction does not
require the taking of any evidence or testimony for admission to a jury.
As for Smith’s challenge to the enhancement based on the vehicle’s value, we
think this sentencing issue will best be determined in the first instance by the District
Court upon our remand for resentencing under Booker.  
Smith’s sentence is herewith vacated and his case is remanded for resentencing in
accordance with Booker.
